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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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ANNUAL REPORT  
**OF THE HIGH COUNCIL ON CLIMATE**

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JUNE 2024

The French are very concerned about climate change, the impacts of which are worsening. At a time when the increased exposure of the population, ecosystems, infrastructures and economic activities to the consequences of climate change presents major risks for society, it is becoming crucial for climate action to protect households and businesses effectively. It must stay the course of decarbonisation and strengthen adaptation to anticipate the future characteristics of a rapidly warming climate.

In 2023 (excluding the Covid crisis), France saw its greenhouse gas emissions fall for the first time at a rate that - if maintained over the coming years - is consistent with a decarbonisation trajectory that will enable it to meet its 2030 targets. The social and economic choices needed to stay the course of decarbonisation over the long term are beginning to take shape in France, in a context also characterised by increased attention to the issues of reindustrialisation and energy and food sovereignty.

These encouraging developments can only be sustained under certain conditions. The conditions for successful climate action over the long term include: clarity and consistency over time; the establishment of trajectories for public incentives (including a carbon price trajectory), green investment, infrastructure renewal and the regeneration of forest ecosystems; and anticipation of resilience needs and constraints on water resources and biomass.

At present, the delay of more than a year in the publication of framework documents relating to energy and climate is leading to slippage in the timetable and a lack of clarity and ownership of the objectives for 2030. Neither the Energy and Climate Programming Act, nor the French Energy and Climate Strategy, nor the third National Low Carbon Strategy, nor the third National Adaptation Plan, nor the third Multiannual Energy Programme have been formally adopted, despite legislative obligations. The renewal of these framework documents is now a matter of urgency in order to maintain the structure of the national policy for reducing emissions and adapting to climate change, and to give all players the visibility they need to act consistently over the long term. The High Council on Climate expresses its deep concern about these delays, which undermine the credibility of France's climate policy.

Despite these delays, the development of the framework for public policy action and emissions over the period of the 2nd carbon budget (2019-2023) allows us to conclude for the first time that the 2030 objective of the Fit for 55 package is achievable, provided that current efforts are rapidly consolidated and continued over the long term, and that the absorption capacity of forest carbon sinks is preserved. However, structural actions must be stepped up, with a clear course set for the 2030-2040 decade, if we are to have the capacity to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Current policies are not sufficiently aligned with the objective of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

Adaptation efforts are beginning to be institutionalised in France, but remain out of step with vulnerabilities and needs, as shown by the worsening impacts in recent years. A change of scale in adaptation, combined with efforts to decarbonise, is essential if we are to better anticipate the consequences of global warming and limit the impact on households and businesses.

The climate factors responsible for impacts are multiplying, intensifying and accumulating in France, Europe and around the world, and their impact on society and ecosystems is worsening. In addition, inequalities in exposure to these factors between households, businesses and professional activities are creating major social risks for communities and regions, in a context where worsening climate change is likely to amplify losses and damage if specific adaptation needs are not taken into account.

The impacts of climate change are multiplying, intensifying and accumulating in France, Europe and around the world, and their consequences for society are worsening. The need for adaptation increases with each additional increase in temperature, and will be all the greater and more costly the later it is taken into account.

- Over the past decade, France has experienced the worsening of a range of impacts attributable to climate change caused by human activities, in particular those brought about by extreme heat events (heatwaves, soil drought, vegetation fires) and various types of flooding (extreme rainfall, river overflows, coastal flooding). It is expected that as the level of global warming increases, so will these risks.
- The high-impact extreme events of 2022 and 2023, like those of the last decade, have highlighted major vulnerabilities in terms of water supply, agricultural production, health (excess mortality, spread of vector-borne diseases in humans and animals), the habitability of certain areas, forests and infrastructures.
- Some areas of France, particularly those that have experienced frequent flooding, have already reached the limits of their capacity to adapt to climate change, due to a combination of increased claims linked to climate change and the withdrawal of certain insurers. If the French insurance system is not adapted, there is a risk that losses and unpaid damage will increase and spread to more areas. A number of adaptation limits have been reached in terms of access to water resources in some of France's neighbouring countries (Spain, Italy, Morocco) and locally in France.

Inequalities between households, businesses and professional activities in terms of exposure to these risks are likely to increase if their specific adaptation needs are not taken into account.

- Urban planning is not evolving fast enough, or in a sufficiently transformational way, to meet the cooling needs of people living in dense urban areas and to limit the new risks of flooding linked to the intensity of rainfall.
- Inequalities in exposure to climate risks need to be taken into account. Certain groups, such as infants and young children, pregnant women, the elderly, isolated people, people with disabilities, poor or low-income households, people suffering from chronic illnesses, socially isolated people, people working outdoors, people working with machines that generate heat, seasonal workers and people living in precarious housing are particularly exposed to climate risks. Similarly, some overseas territories suffer from a combination of vulnerability factors (shortage of healthcare staff, lack of sanitation infrastructure or hospital facilities).
- These inequalities exacerbate public health problems. The elderly, infants and young children are more prone to dehydration, making them more vulnerable to extreme heat waves. Extreme heat is also associated with an increase in mental health problems, and very hot weather increases the risk of premature birth. These situations put a strain on public health, education and infrastructure maintenance services, which are no longer able to guarantee the continuity of their activities for extreme events, whose occurrence and intensity increase.

Adaptation is in the process of being institutionalised and put on a permanent footing, with a government department dedicated to managing it, a resource centre and climate services. Nevertheless, there is a growing gap between the measures taken to deal with the impacts of climate change and the need for adaptation, as the climatic hazards caused by global warming are intensifying more rapidly than the resources deployed to limit their impact.

The development of the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) has been marked by a broader participation of a wider range of stakeholders and consultation of the National Council for Ecological Transition (CNTE) at every stage, but the timetable for the preparation of the 3rd NAP, which began in April 2022 and whose publication is still pending, does not take sufficient account of the urgent need for action.

- The public action strategy is unclear and confused by the accumulation of consultations that are not based on a climate change vulnerability assessment and the lack of publication of the results of consultations and working meetings.
- Difficulties in linking adaptation policy at the national and local levels are hampering skills development among local players and the implementation of adaptation actions in the territories, although the launch of the adaptation service bringing together the expertise of state operators in a one-stop-shop could be a significant step towards a public adaptation service capable of meeting capacity-building needs.

The development of a reference trajectory is an important step forward in defining adaptation needs on a French scale. By anticipating 4°C of warming in France by 2100, it should facilitate the operationalisation and consistency of adaptation actions once it has been formally adopted in law, regulations and technical guidelines, and will serve as the reference scenario for the 3rd NAP.

- France does not have an in-depth risks and vulnerabilities assessment to the impacts of climate change, with the last collective assessment dating back to 2014. Regular updates of such a report are essential.
- While reactive measures currently cost several billion euros a year, it is necessary to anticipate the rising costs of impacts and adaptation in order to direct funding towards the most sustainable investments, avoid future stranded assets and maintain a sustainable financing capacity for public authorities.
- A legal framework favourable to adaptation to climate change is under construction, but still needs to be completed to facilitate the effective implementation of large-scale adaptation actions, as demonstrated, for example, by the obsolescence or absence of guidelines in the fields of land-use planning and housing.
- Insurance premium rates are not currently conditional on the implementation of measures to adapt to climate change, and destroyed property is rebuilt identically, thus limiting the role of insurance as a risk prevention tool.

The fall in gross greenhouse gas emissions has accelerated over the past year and is approaching the rate expected to achieve France's 2030 targets. It is vital to stay the course of decarbonisation over the long term, while strengthening the carbon sinks in soils and forests.

According to provisional data from Citepa, gross greenhouse gas emissions fell by 5.8% compared with 2022, to reach 373 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2023, or 31% below their 1990 level. This drop of 22.8 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e (excluding the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector) is more than twice the average drop of 10.9 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e per year observed over the period 2019-2022, and thus represents an acceleration in the rate of decline in emissions observed. Gross emissions in 2023 are the lowest since inventories began. Carbon sinks in the LULUCF sector are relatively stable, after falling sharply over the period 2013-2017, but remain vulnerable to climate change.

- At least a third (around 7.5 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e) of the decline observed between 2022 and 2023 is explained by cyclical factors, in particular the return to normal of electricity production after the shutdown of several nuclear power plants and the lack of water in dams in 2022. Excluding these cyclical factors, the structural reduction in gross emissions is estimated at 15.3 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e. This figure corresponds to the maximum value attributable to public climate policies. All the major emitting sectors have seen their emissions fall by 2023, as have most of the sub-sectors.
- The second carbon budget covering the period 2019-2023 is on track to be met for gross emissions (excluding LULUCF), according to provisional data from Citepa, with a margin of 100 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e. For net emissions (including LULUCF), the second carbon budget is on track to be exceeded, with an excess of 15 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e, due to the very significant weakening of the forest carbon sink. The energy and buildings sectors are well within their carbon budgets, while the agriculture, industry and transport sectors are within them by a small margin, and the waste and LULUCF sectors are well above them.
- France's carbon footprint is estimated at 623 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2022, i.e. 9.2 tCO<sub>2</sub>e per capita. It is 1.6 times higher than territorial emissions. France's carbon footprint is higher than the global average, which in 2022 will be 6.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> eq per capita. The carbon footprint fell by 8% between 2010 and 2019 (based on consolidated data), mainly as a result of the fall in territorial emissions. Imported emissions account for around half of the carbon footprint.

The rate of decline in France's gross emissions over the period of the second carbon budget (2019-2023) is approaching, but has not yet reached, the rate required to achieve the provisional 2030 target of the draft third National Low Carbon Strategy (SNBC 3), in line with the European climate law of July 2021 and the Fit for 55 framework adopted at European level.

- The average annual fall in gross emissions of 13.2 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e over the period 2019-2023 (provisional data) is close to the 15.0 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e expected over the period 2024-2030 and needed to achieve the new 2030 targets set out in the draft SNBC 3. The fall observed in 2023, even excluding the contribution of known cyclical factors, is in line with the necessary trajectory and must therefore be maintained over the long term, hence the importance of staying the course on decarbonisation. The average annual fall in net emissions (including carbon sinks) of 12.5 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e over the period 2019-2023 is still 1.3 times below the expected fall of 16.1 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e over the period 2024-2030, which is needed to achieve the Fit for 55 targets adopted at European level.

- The rate of decline in gross emissions observed over the period 2019-2023 is compatible with the provisional sectoral targets of the draft SNBC 3 for the period 2024-2030, except for the transport sector (which must accelerate by a factor of 3.2) and the waste sector (which must reverse its upward trend). These discrepancies should be adjusted when the SNBC 3 is consolidated, by mobilising more of the sectors that are currently under less pressure (agriculture, energy).
- The carbon sink in the LULUCF sector provided for in the draft SNBC 3, although resulting from the more realistic consideration of the state of carbon sinks, does not make it possible to meet the Fit for 55 targets for 2030, as adopted at European level. The expected shortfall in carbon sinks is not made up by a greater reduction in gross emissions; the draft SNBC 3 therefore targets a 52% reduction in net emissions by 2030, which is below the collective target of 55% agreed by the Member States of the European Union. The 2030 target for net emissions and carbon sinks from France's LULUCF sector and France's contribution to the targets negotiated at European level must therefore be clarified when the SNBC 3 is renewed.

Public policies are making significant progress and producing results. However, they are unevenly structured across sectors and are not sufficiently aligned with the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050. The failure to take sufficient account of adaptation to climate change and just transition represents a major social and economic risk.

Sectoral policies are taking shape, with significant but uneven progress being made across sectors, and with some sectors, particularly agriculture, taking a step backwards. These structural changes are beginning to be reflected in the results, but many risks and uncertainties remain. Several sub-sectors are not yet covered by sufficient policies to enable significant changes to be made, and the orientations of policies covering several sectors are not sufficiently aligned with the conditions required to achieve carbon neutrality in 2050. Current policies do not reduce the vulnerability of households and businesses to energy price shocks.

- Transport sector (34% of gross national emissions). Policy in the transport sector is gradually shifting from a project-based approach to a more systemic one. The sector has embarked on its decarbonisation trajectory after a long delay. Economic policy instruments for the electrification of vehicles are becoming increasingly effective, national measures to encourage the purchase of electric vehicles are complementing European measures to encourage their production, and the deployment of charging stations is proceeding according to plan. The effects of modal shift policies have not yet been seen, and the tools needed to control travel demand have yet to be identified. There has been virtually no change in the use of alternative engines for heavy goods vehicles, despite the fact that the national logistics strategy identifies the various areas and needs for decarbonisation, but has so far failed to bring about any significant change. Adaptation to climate change is mainly approached from the angle of infrastructure damage, with little anticipation of future hazards.
- Agriculture (20% of gross national emissions). Agricultural policies suffer from a lack of integration and coordination with food, health, environmental and climate policies, limiting decarbonisation and adaptation in the sector. Despite some progress in recent years, over the last 12 months agricultural policies have been marked by a decline in public action on climate change. On the whole, they contribute to locking agricultural production into emission-intensive models rather than helping farmers to adopt low-carbon models and practices. Furthermore, they do not protect farmers from the negative effects of climate change to which their profession over-exposes them. Subsidies from the Common Agricultural

Policy as part of the National Strategic Plan (PSN) are structural, but contribute only marginally to the low-carbon transition and adaptation. Public action on food is mainly based on consumer information and voluntary approaches. It does little to encourage intermediary players to develop a low-carbon, healthy and accessible offer. Adaptation needs have been identified, but implementation is too limited, has insufficient resources and is poorly linked to mitigation capacities.

- Industry (17% of gross national emissions). The decarbonisation strategy for industry relies on the players in the sectors, with an iterative process that has significantly improved the roadmaps (standardisation, addition of scenarios, longer-term vision, clear quantification, more ambitious targets) and led to the signing of transition contracts to reduce emissions by at least 45% by 2030 compared with 2019. Nevertheless, the overall strategy lacks intermediate milestones and suffers from a failure to identify the barriers that could limit the deployment of solutions (e.g. changes in professions and training) over a very short timeframe in a sector with a high degree of inertia. The carbon adjustment mechanism at Europe's borders and the precise terms and conditions of its application will be decisive in strengthening the effectiveness of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). There are major disparities in carbon pricing, including exemptions, with unequal access to subsidies and infrastructure. The adaptation of the industrial sector is still largely unaddressed.
- Building sector (16% of gross national emissions). Overall support for the renovation sector has been strengthened and public aid for renovation has risen sharply, although public policies lack stability over time. The strategy continues to be characterised by support for single-action renovations, and aid remains focused on changing heating methods in favour of electrification. This trend is being maintained at the expense of developing the insulation needed to achieve a low-carbon housing stock and reduce fuel poverty, which increased in France in 2024. The major obstacles to effective mass renovation are the training of professionals, quality control of renovation work, and the difficulty of bringing projects to fruition in co-ownerships. The renovation strategy for public buildings has not yet been clearly defined. Summer comfort is better included in policies for adapting existing housing, but the risk of clay shrinkage and swelling has not yet been addressed.
- Energy sector (10% of gross national emissions). France's energy strategy is generally well structured, but its contribution to achieving climate objectives is not guaranteed and is fraught with weaknesses. The discrepancy between legislative timetables and the weakening of the legislative support for texts and objectives lead to a loss of overall coherence and hamper implementation. The strategy for renewing the current nuclear fleet, given the high level of industrial uncertainty in the sector, poses risks for the availability of low-carbon electricity by 2035. For the time being, these risks are insufficiently offset by the growth in renewable energies. Support for the development of renewable capacity is well structured, but remains insufficient for renewable energies that do not reach their target. The acceleration of deployment is limited by a lack of skills. The levers enabling the flexibility of electricity and gas networks are not being used to their full potential and should be developed on a more structural basis. The development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in France is inconsistent with the medium- and long-term objectives and risks leading to stranded assets if supply contracts are not regulated accordingly. Several emerging sectors (renewable gas, low-carbon hydrogen, new heating networks) are part of the industrial innovation policy and are supported by fast-growing investment. Adaptation to climate change is taken into account by the highly exposed sectors, in particular the nuclear sector, but is only very briefly addressed in the draft Multiannual Energy Programme (PPE) put out to consultation, despite the significant climatic impacts on energy production, distribution and demand. The reform of the European electricity market is improving the protection of

vulnerable consumers, while the framework for energy communities has been strengthened, but exceptional spending to support the consumption of fossil fuels has been insufficiently targeted at low incomes.

- LULUCF sector (offsetting 5.5% of gross national emissions). The weakening of France's forests and the significant decline in carbon sinks in the LULUCF sector, which are essential if carbon neutrality is to be achieved, have been recognised and numerous actions have been taken by the government and the industry to remedy the situation. However, no wide-ranging strategy or plan to regenerate forest ecosystems has yet been proposed, and an ambitious policy to promote carbon storage in agricultural soils is still lacking. Public action is insufficient to meet the needs of forest adaptation and regeneration, and favours wood-energy use at the expense of use as a long-lasting material. There are few conditions attached to public support or taxation for sustainable forestry practices. Encouraging the maintenance of grasslands, like the introduction of incentives for agricultural practices that allow more carbon to be stored in the soil, must be included in agricultural policies. Public policies affecting the forestry and wood sector include the major adaptation issues it faces, but forest management and fire protection documents are still a long way from what is needed.

The public policy framework is developing positively. The 2030 target is within reach, provided that the public policy framework is consolidated and current efforts are sustained over the long term. However, shifts in the legislative timetable mean that there is a risk of backsliding.

Legislative provisions concerning climate action are behind schedule, despite concerted efforts. These delays are undermining climate action because of the lack of clarity in the directions being taken, creating ambiguities both on short- and medium-term targets and on the trajectory towards carbon neutrality by 2050.

- Neither the Energy and Climate Programming Act, nor the French Energy and Climate Strategy, nor the third National Low Carbon Strategy, nor the third National Adaptation Plan, nor the third Multiannual Energy Programme have been formally adopted, despite legislative obligations. The renewal of these framework documents is now urgently needed to maintain the structure of the national policy for reducing emissions and adapting to climate change.
- The draft SNBC 3 represents a step forward, as it aims to strengthen the objectives for 2030 in line with the policies established at European level, on the basis of a more realistic and operational approach. However, the 2030 target does not yet reach the level for France resulting from Fit for 55 (see above), and the plan is limited to the year 2033, without covering the anticipated trajectory towards carbon neutrality. These elements will need to be clarified within the consolidated draft of SNBC 3, and completed with the expected level of the carbon budget for the period 2034-2038 and the indicative caps for emissions from the carbon footprint and international transport.

Despite legislative delays, the public policy framework is developing positively. It still needs to be consolidated in order to spread climate action throughout the economy in a coherent and long-term manner, taking into account the practical constraints and concerns expressed in the implementation of climate policies on the ground.

- The public policy framework in terms of strategy and governance appears to be functional and operational, although it is currently under review. The reviews are being carried out at two levels: that of national climate strategies and plans (SNBC,



PPE, NAP) and that of sectoral decarbonisation strategies (transport, agriculture, construction, energy and forest/soil). The continuity of public action, from steering by the government to operational implementation on the ground, is a lever for strengthening climate action by making policies consistent, aligning objectives and seeking synergies between a greater number of action plans and projects.

- Economic policy is becoming clearer, with efforts being made to align economic policy instruments with climate policy guidelines, but the necessary multiannual funding is not yet guaranteed, and cancellations of appropriations are undermining the stability of investments. Economic policies on reindustrialisation, food sovereignty and forest management will only be consistent with climate ambitions if they respect the limits corresponding to emissions trajectories, establish stable and predictable trajectories for the renewal of infrastructures (transport, housing, networks), reorganise markets and employment to establish the price of carbon (ETS and taxation), adapt production systems to climate change and enhance the value of products from new low-carbon productions.
- Activating the levers and removing the obstacles are essential conditions for scaling up climate policies. In several business sectors, vocational training stands out as a cross-cutting lever and a necessary condition for incorporating decarbonisation issues through new practices or activities. The lack of foresight in this area limits the capacity to implement decarbonisation measures, particularly in the building, agriculture and renewable energy sectors, and for measures to store carbon in forests and soils.
- Sectoral adaptation to climate change is inconsistent and insufficiently operational, and suffers from delays in the publication of framework documents. The draft SNBC 3, put out to consultation in May 2024, makes an explicit link between the actions supported by the SNBC and those supported by the future NAP, in particular through the draft Reference Trajectory for Adaptation to Climate Change (TRACC). This relationship is likely to facilitate the search for synergies and the resolution of conflicts between adaptation and mitigation actions, at a time when there is a risk of a loss of effectiveness in emissions reduction actions due to a lack of adaptation, particularly in the agricultural and LULUCF sectors.
- The sectoral analyses highlight the need to take account of just transition aspects, as shown by the strong demand for social leasing of electric vehicles. However, there remain a number of areas of concern with regard to the situation of households, such as the increase in debt linked to expenditure on housing and energy renovation, changes in jobs and skills, access to insurance and the demand for a rebalancing of the distribution of value in certain agricultural production sectors; the situation also poses risks for businesses, with, for example, a wide disparity in carbon pricing. The draft SNBC 3 explicitly displays an interest in just transition issues, approached through the prism of climate action, and marks an intention to target certain funding according to criteria of social justice, in accordance with the principles set out in ecological planning.

The governance and management of climate action, for both mitigation and adaptation, have been further improved within the ecological transition, with better coordination of ministerial or inter-ministerial climate action programmes through a systemic and structured approach, under the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister via the General Secretariat for Ecological Planning (SGPE).

- The central government departments responsible for steering climate policies consolidated and restructured their organisation in 2023. A new sub-directorate responsible for financing the ecological transition has been created within the

Treasury. A new sub-directorate for climate action has been created within the Directorate-General for Energy and Climate, bringing together the various components of mitigation and institutionalising the steering of adaptation.

- With the monitoring of the ecological transition, public action on climate change is being made much more transparent. Progress in ecological planning is regularly reported to the CNTE by the SGPE and the ministers concerned, in the presence of the Prime Minister when structural elements are presented. Since November 2023, the regional COPs have supplemented the system by means of consultations dedicated to taking account of specific regional features in ecological planning.

The evolution of the framework for public policy action and emissions over the period of the second carbon budget (2019-2023) leads to the conclusion that the 2030 target resulting from the Fit for 55 is achievable, provided that current efforts are consolidated, maintained over the long term and any emissions not yet targeted are allocated through measures to be included in the draft SNBC 3.

On the other hand, the alignment of existing public policies with the objective of neutrality by 2050 is deemed insufficient on the basis of the trends observed, the developments announced and the challenges still to be met. The main uncertainties concern the lack of long-term visibility on the deployment of renewable energy production to complement nuclear power, due to the delay in drawing up the PPE; the lack of guarantees on the reconstitution of the forest carbon sink, which has been weakened by climate change; the lack of control over the demand for mobility of people and goods in the transport sector; the effectiveness of climate conditionalities and the forthcoming changes to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) associated with the development of a lower-carbon food supply in the agricultural sector and; in the building sector, a shift towards efficient renovations, in addition to the electrification of heating.

By providing a favourable framework, the European Union's Green Deal and the Fit for 55 package support France's climate strategy for 2030. Beyond that, France will have to take a stand on the 2040 target proposed by the European Commission, by supporting an ambitious and realistic target, in order to help strengthen global climate ambitions.

At European Union level, the Green Deal and its implementation as part of the Fit for 55 package have represented a change of approach in terms of their ambition and scope: the aim is to make Europe the first continent to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 as part of a sustainable, fair and prosperous society. Placing the European Union on a carbon-neutral trajectory means maintaining sustained efforts at all levels to begin implementation as quickly as possible and securing resources commensurate with the investment needed to decarbonise. The Green Deal cannot be implemented without sufficiently broad support from all sections of society, which means that issues of equity must be placed at the heart of the future political agenda of the EU and its Member States.

- With the European climate law, "climate neutrality" by 2050 and the increase in ambition for 2030 become collective objectives for the Member States and become part of the EU's legal corpus. With the Fit for 55 package, the mitigation aspect of the Green Deal is now well underway at European level. Its implementation now depends largely on the way in which the Member States implement it at national level. The funding needed for implementation, both at European and national level, must be secured quickly, which means redirecting existing funding towards investments in the low-carbon transition, as well as developing a European climate investment plan. A strong political will is needed to tackle in depth

the issues linked to the competitiveness of European industry (relocation, critical resources and new dependencies, strategic alliances, regulations in favour of a green industry, etc.) and to review international trade rules so that they better support the global climate transition.

- The implementation of European measures and their application at national level will have to take full account of the socio-economic impact of the measures on workers, households and businesses, and give priority to socially fair measures, while establishing a lasting dialogue with all sections of society. In addition to financial aid, a major training programme is needed to adapt workers' qualifications to the needs of Europe's future "net zero" economy, while ensuring the creation of better quality, better remunerated green jobs.
- Strong European coordination will be essential in the run-up to COP30 (2025) to prepare a collective EU contribution (NDC) that is fully aligned with the Paris Agreement objective of keeping the rise in global average temperature well below 2°C and as close as possible to 1.5°C. Strong political will also be needed to work towards the adoption of a credible European plan for the gradual phase-out of fossil fuels, coupled with an acceleration in the deployment of renewable energy and measures to reduce demand through energy efficiency and sobriety.
- France has adopted ambitious positions on climate change at European level, but these are not entirely in line with the positions it defends in certain sectoral policies, such as agriculture. The credibility of these positions also depends on the commitments made at European level being rapidly translated into national legislation, with a view to setting an example.

At global level, progress was made at COP28 in Dubai. Generally speaking, a more harmonised and transparent regime is gradually being developed to govern the commitments made by countries in the context of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and long-term strategies, as well as the climate-related announcements made by non-state actors. However, there is still a lot of work to be done to improve the quality and credibility of these commitments (in particular, clarification of net-zero commitments, sectoral coverage, carbon footprint, inclusion of international transport, etc.).

- At COP28, the results of the global assessment confirmed that strong additional measures in the period 2025-2030, coupled with the full implementation of existing commitments, are therefore necessary to now change the overall trajectory of emissions. The increased climate ambitions for 2030 and beyond must be reflected in the NDCs to be presented by the countries ahead of COP30, which will be held in 2025.
- For the first time, the transition away from fossil fuels was included in a multilateral decision at COP28. Although the text of the decision remains imprecise and limited in scope, this reference sends out an important political signal that will need to be reinforced in the future. No significant progress was made on ending fossil fuel subsidies, which have reached record levels in recent years. The inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions other than carbon dioxide, in particular methane, has been confirmed, but more precise commitments are needed for 2030. The role of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies is recognised, without specifying the limited role that should be reserved for them for credible deployment, given the technical and socio-economic constraints and their current level of maturity.
- France is active at international level to contribute to the global drive to raise climate ambitions, in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Its action is coordinated with that of the European Union and supported by a permanent

interministerial team. In order to increase the credibility of France's diplomatic influence, this action must continue in all international fora (climate and non-climate) and be effectively reflected in national policies, in particular through the definition of a credible trajectory and a national timetable for phasing out fossil fuels.

- France supports the climate transition of developing countries, in particular for adaptation, and the continuation of action to respond to loss and damage in vulnerable countries. For several years, France has been promoting the idea of reforming the international financial system and aligning financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, although concrete changes are far too slow in view of the needs of the global energy transition. France is involved in a large number of sectoral initiatives and participates in several high-stakes international political coalitions, but its participation is not structured by an explicit strategy, the monitoring of its commitments is still fragmented, and it does not always specify how it intends to implement the commitments made in this context at national level.

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